THEORY OF SOCIETY VOLUME 2

By Niklas Luhmann, Rhodes Barrett

Stanford University Press

Copyright © 1997 Suhrkamp Verlag Frankfurt am Main
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8047-7160-3

Contents

4. Differentiation…………………………………………………15. Self-Descriptions……………………………………………….167Notes…………………………………………………………….351Index to Volume 2………………………………………………….439Index to Volume 1………………………………………………….447

CHAPTER 1

Differentiation

1. System Differentiation

Since its inception, sociology has been concerned with differentiation.The term alone deserves attention. It stands for the unity (or establishmentof the unity) of difference. Older societies, too, had naturallyobserved differences; they distinguished between town dwellers and countrydwellers, between nobles and peasants, between the members of onefamily and those of another. But they were satisfied to note the differingqualities of beings and ways of life and to form corresponding expectations,as they also did in dealing with things. The concept of differentiationallowed a more abstract approach, and this step toward abstraction is likelyto have been caused by the nineteenth-century tendency to see unities anddifferences as the outcome of processes—whether of evolutionary developmentsor (as in the case of politically united “nations”) of purposive action.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, this concept of differentiationmade it possible to switch from theories of progress to structuralanalysis, while nevertheless adopting the economist’s belief in the productivenessof the division of labor. Talcott Parsons’s general theory of the actionsystem still built on this concept, which offered a key formula bothfor analyzing development (increasing differentiation) and for explainingmodern individualism as the result of role differentiation. It led GeorgSimmel to analyze money, Émile Durkheim to reflect on changes in theforms of moral solidarity, and Max Weber to develop his concept of the rationalizationof different orders of life such as religion, the economy, politics,and eroticism. The dominance of the differentiation concept provesuseful precisely because it does not exclude seemingly disparate theoreticalapproaches—to development, to individuality, to value criteria—butrather gives access to them. In sum, differentiation is necessary to maintaincohesion under conditions of growth.

The differentiation concept enabled modern society to admire andcriticize itself. It could regard itself as the irreversible outcome of historyand look to the future with a great deal of skepticism. For Simmel as forWeber, highly developed “form” is a correlate of differentiation, as is theemergence of individuality for practically all the classical sociologists. Atthe same time, however, form is not to be had without a disturbing loss ofmeaning: it always involves restriction and renunciation; and individualitydoes not make the individual what he would like to be, but producesthe experience of alienation. Together with individual particularity, awarenessdevelops of what this particularity does not entail, generating, sincethe end of the nineteenth century, various theories of a plural self, of conflictbetween personal and social identity, or of contradictory socialization.

This overdetermination through connectivity options is, however, atthe cost of conceptual clarity. I therefore limit the concept to the specialcase of system differentiation, thus making it more difficult to draw overhastyconclusions about individual behavior from structural problems insocietal differentiation. Naturally, this does not prevent us from speakingof role differentiation or differentiated taste, of conceptual differentiation,or of terminological differentiation in a quite general sense. Everythingthat is distinguished can, if we mean the result of the operation, also bedescribed as difference. However, my thesis is that other differentiationsarise from the differentiation of systems and can therefore be explainedby system differentiation; and this is so because every operational (recursive)connection of operations generates a difference between system andenvironment.

If a social system emerges in this manner, I speak of it differentiatingout [ausdifferenzieren] against what this process then makes into the environment.Such outdifferentiation can, as in the case of the societal system,take place in the unmarked space of meaningful possibilities (that can becomeopen to marking only through differentiation), hence in the otherwiseunlimited world. But it can also take place within already formedsystems. This is the only case I shall call system differentiation, or, whenconsidering the difference mentioned, internal differentiation of the systemconcerned.

System differentiation is thus nothing other than recursive system formation,the application of system formation to its own result. The system inwhich further systems arise is reconstructed by a further distinction betweensubsystem and environment. From the perspective of the subsystem, therest of the comprehensive system is now environment. For the subsystemthe overall system now appears to be the unity of the difference betweensubsystem and subsystem environment. In other words, system differentiationgenerates intrasystemic environments. To employ a now familiar term,we are dealing with the “reentry” of the distinction between system and environmentinto what has been distinguished, into the system.

It is important to understand this process with the necessary precision.It does not involve the decomposition of a “whole” into “parts,” in eitherthe conceptual sense (divisio) or the sense of actual division (partitio). Thewhole/part schema comes from the old European tradition, and if appliedin this context would miss the decisive point. System differentiation doesnot mean that the whole is divided into parts and, seen on this level, thenconsists only of the parts and the “relations” between the parts. It is ratherthat every subsystem reconstructs the comprehensive system to which itbelongs and which it contributes to forming through its own (subsystem-specific) difference between system and environment. Through system differentiation,the system multiplies itself, so to speak, within itself throughever-new distinctions between systems and environments in the system.The differentiation process can set in spontaneously; it is a result of evolution,which can use opportunities to launch structural changes. It requiresno coordination by the overall system such as the schema of the whole andits parts had suggested. Nor does it require all operations carried out in theoverall system to be distributed among subsystems, so that the overall systemcan then operate only in the subsystems. Even a highly differentiatedsociety allows a great deal of “free” interaction. The consequence is a differentiationof societal system and interaction systems that varies with the differentiationform of society.

The differentiation process can thus begin somewhere or other andsomehow or other and reinforce the deviation that has arisen. One settlementamong many comes to be preferred where the advantages of centralizationare mutually reinforcing, so that finally a new distinction developsbetween town and country. It is only this development that makes other settlementsinto “villages” as opposed to the town, villages that gradually adjustto the idea that there is a town where people can live differently than in thevillage and that, as the environment of the village, modifies its possibilities.

In the context of system differentiation, every change is therefore adouble, indeed, multiple, one. Every change to a subsystem is also a changeto the environment of other subsystems. Whatever happens, happens inmultiplicity—depending on the system reference. Thus a rapid declinein the demand for labor in the economy brought on by economic developmentsor competition can induce an increase in rationality and efficiency,while in the political system, in the families affected, in the educationalsystem of schools and universities, or as a new subject of research for scholars(“the future of work”) it can set off quite different causal series on accountof changes in the environment of these systems. Even though it is thesame event for all systems! This sets off enormous dynamization, almostexplosive reactive pressure, against which single subsystems can protectthemselves only by erecting high thresholds of indifference. Differentiationtherefore necessarily increases both dependence and independence underthe specification and systemic control of the aspects in which one is dependentor independent. As a result, subsystems develop exclusively as operationallyclosed autopoietic systems.

Switching from the whole-part schema to that of system-environmentin analyzing society facilitates the coordination of systems theory and evolutiontheory. It provides better insight into the morphogenesis of complexity.It shows more precisely how unity can reenter itself by means ofdistinctions; and it leaves completely open how many such possibilitiesthere are, and whether and in what form they can be coordinated.

In many other regards, too, systems theory offers a greater wealth oflogical structure than the tradition of thinking in wholes and parts. It can(and must), for example, distinguish between system-environment relationsand system-system relations (tradition knows only the latter). Onlywith the distinction between system and environment does the system capturethe unity of the world or the unity of the comprehensive system, andit does so by means of a self-referential distinction. With system-system relations(e.g., between family and school) it captures only segments of theworld or of society. However, it is this very segmentariness that makes it possibleto observe the given other system as system-in-its-own-environmentand hence to reconstruct the world or society from the perspective of observingobservations (second-order observation). In the environment ofother systems, the system that observes them is also to be found. The overallsystem that opens up these perspectives thus puts pressure on itself, soto speak, to reflect.

In the system-system relations permitted by a societal order of differentiation,only such structural couplings can exist that do not cancel outthe autopoiesis of subsystems. This is true, for example, of relations betweenvillagers in segmentary societies, and for relations between castes orestates of birth [Geburtsstände] in hierarchical orders, and, in much morecomplex and complicated forms, also of relations between the functionalsystems of modern society. What functions as structural coupling in relationsbetween subsystems is, however, also a structure of the comprehensivesystem of society. This justifies describing societal systems above all interms of their form of differentiation, for this is the form of structure formationthat determines and limits what structural couplings between subsystemsare possible.

Finally, switching from the whole-part schema to the system-environmentschema changes the value of the “integration” concept. In oldEuropean thinking, there was no special term for this, for integration of theparts was presupposed in the wholeness of the whole as ordinata concordia[well-ordered concord], and expressed with regard to single phenomena astheir nature or essence. Classical sociology reformulated the problem as amore or less regular relationship between differentiation and integration.Differentiation, it was claimed, could not be carried to the extreme of completeindifference. “Quelques rapports de parenté,” in Durkheim’s view,followed alone from the circumstance that the differentiation of a systemwas at issue. Parsons put it this way: “Since these differences are conceivedto have emerged by a process of change in a system … the presumption isthat the differentiated parts are comparable in the sense of being systematicallyrelated to each other, both because they still belong within the samesystem and, through their interrelations, to their antecedents.” The conceptof integration is, however, mostly left undefined, and, as critics havepointed out, ambiguous. Inadequately considered premises for consensusoften feed into the empirical conditions for integration. As a result, theterm continues to be used to express perspectives of unity or even expectationsof solidarity and to urge appropriate attitudes—in the old Europeanstyle! The historical process is described as one of emanation: out ofhomogeneity comes heterogeneity, and heterogeneity replaces homogeneityby requiring differentiation and integration at the same time. Undersuch circumstances, mobility is often claimed to assume the function ofintegration, and “mobilization” is therefore considered one of the crucialrecipes for modernization policy in developing countries (as long as thechaotic consequences of migration and urbanization do not demonstratethe contrary).

However, a normative concept that promotes or at least approves ofintegration must face growing opposition in societies that are becomingmore complex. Retaining such a concept imposes paradoxical or tautological,self-implicative formulations. Communication of the precept (andhow else is it to become reality?) will provoke more “noes” than “yesses,”so that the hope of integration finally leads to rejection of the society inwhich one lives. What then?

To avoid such overinterpretation, I take integration to mean no morethan reduction in the degrees of freedom of subsystems due to the externalboundaries of the societal system and the internal environment of this systemthey define. For every autopoietic system that differentiates out generatesinternal indeterminacies, which structural developments can eitheraugment or reduce. Under this definition, integration is hence an aspectof dealing with or using internal indeterminacies at the level of both theoverall system and its subsystems.

Unlike the societal system, its subsystems have two environments:that external to society and that internal to society. So defined, integrationis neither a value-laden concept nor “better” than disintegration. Nordoes it refer to the “unity” of the differentiated system (which, purely interms of conceptual logic, follows from the fact that, although there canbe more or less integration, there cannot be more or less unity). Integrationis hence not commitment to a unity perspective, let alone a matter of”obedience” on the part of subsystems to central authorities. It lies, not inthe relation of “parts” to the “whole,” but in the shifting, also historicallyvariable adjustment of subsystems to one another. Degrees of freedom canbe restricted by the conditions of cooperation, but even more strongly byconflict. The concept is therefore not directly concerned with the differencebetween cooperation and conflict: it is superordinate to this distinction.The problem of conflict is the excessive integration of subsystems,which mobilize more and more resources for the dispute, withdrawingthem from other fields; and the problem of a complex society is then toensure sufficient disintegration.

Such restriction can develop where connections come into play—connectionsbetween operations or connections between operations andstructures—without consensus being required. This saves attention inpsychic systems and the coordination of intentions in the social system.The “restriction” is not noticed. This is a relief. On the other hand, itmakes any change to the “tacit collective structure,” as it is often called,more difficult. Accidents or failures are often needed to produce awarenessthat reliance had been placed on coordination that had not necessarilyoccurred.

If we look into the conditions for integration/disintegration, weultimately encounter a temporal relation. For everything that happens(if considered from a temporal point of view) happens simultaneously.The consequence is, first, that simultaneous events cannot mutually influenceor control one another; for causality requires a time differencebetween cause and effect, hence a crossing of the temporal boundariesof what happens simultaneously. On the other hand, the unity of anevent, an accident, an action, an eclipse of the sun, or a thunderstormcan take very different forms depending on the interests of observers. Itis not necessary to heed system boundaries. Tabling a budget in parliamentcan be an event in the political system, in the legal system, in thesystem of the mass media, and in the economic system. This means thatintegration takes place continuously in the sense of the mutual restrictionof the degrees of freedom enjoyed by systems. But this integrationeffect is limited to single events. As soon as we take account of prehistoryand consequences, as soon as we thus cross the time boundaries of whathappens simultaneously and take recursions into account, the magneticfield of the system acts on identification; the legal act of introducingthe draft budget is then something other than an occasion for reportsand comments in the media, something other than the political symbolizationof consensus and dissent, something other than what the stockmarkets perceive. In the pulsation of events, systems integrate and disintegratethemselves from one moment to the next. If repeated and thenanticipated, this may influence the structural development of the systemsinvolved. Humberto Maturana speaks of “structural drift.” But theoperational basis for integration/disintegration remains the single event,which is identified simultaneously at a given moment in a number of systems.No action can be adequately planned, no communication successfullylaunched without mastering this complicated mechanism, howeverbiased the interest-driven and systemically conditioned contributionsmay prove to be.
(Continues…)Excerpted from THEORY OF SOCIETY VOLUME 2 by Niklas Luhmann, Rhodes Barrett. Copyright © 1997 Suhrkamp Verlag Frankfurt am Main. Excerpted by permission of Stanford University Press.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.

THEORY OF SOCIETY

VOLUME 1By Niklas Luhmann

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

ISBN: 978-0-8047-3950-4

Contents

Preface…………………………………………………………………………xiTranslator’s Note………………………………………………………………..xv1. Society as a Social System……………………………………………………..11.1. The Sociological Theory of Society…………………………………………….11.2. Preliminary Remarks on Methodology…………………………………………….131.3. Meaning…………………………………………………………………….181.4. The Distinction Between System and Environment………………………………….281.5. Society as a Comprehensive Social System……………………………………….401.6. Operational Closure and Structural Couplings……………………………………491.7. Cognition…………………………………………………………………..681.8. Ecological Problems………………………………………………………….731.9. Complexity………………………………………………………………….771.10. World Society………………………………………………………………831.11. Demands on Rationality………………………………………………………992. Communication Media……………………………………………………………1132.1. Medium and Form……………………………………………………………..1132.2. Dissemination Media and Success media………………………………………….1202.3. Language……………………………………………………………………1232.4. Morality and the Secrets of Religion…………………………………………..1382.5. Writing…………………………………………………………………….1502.6. Printing……………………………………………………………………1742.7. Electronic Media…………………………………………………………….1802.8. Dissemination Media: Summary………………………………………………….1872.9. Symbolically Generalized Communication Media, 1: Function………………………..1902.10. Symbolically Generalized Communication Media, 2: Differentiation…………………1992.11. Symbolically Generalized Communication Media, 3: Structures……………………..2142.12. Symbolically Generalized Communication Media, 4: Self-Validation…………………2362.13. Moral Communication…………………………………………………………2392.14. Effects on the Evolution of the Societal System………………………………..2453. Evolution…………………………………………………………………….2513.1. Creation, Planning, Evolution…………………………………………………2513.2. Systems-Theoretical Basis…………………………………………………….2613.3. The Neo-Darwinian Theory of Evolution………………………………………….2723.4. The Variation of Elements…………………………………………………….2753.5. Selection Through Media………………………………………………………2843.6. The Restabilization of Systems………………………………………………..2923.7. Differentiation of Variation, Selection, and Restabilization……………………..3003.8. Evolutionary Advances………………………………………………………..3053.9. Technology………………………………………………………………….3123.10. The Evolution of Ideas………………………………………………………3243.11. The Evolution of Subsystems………………………………………………….3363.12. Evolution and History……………………………………………………….3433.13. Memory…………………………………………………………………….348Notes…………………………………………………………………………..359Index…………………………………………………………………………..455

Chapter One

Society as a Social System

1. The Sociological Theory of Society

The investigations that follow address the social system of modern society. Such a project, it should be said at the outset, engages a circular relationship with its subject matter. What this subject matter is cannot be said in advance. The word “society” does not refer to a clear-cut idea. Even the common term “social” has no incontestably objective reference. Nor can the attempt to describe society be made outside of society. It uses communication. It activates social relations. It exposes itself to observation in society. However we define the subject, its definition is itself already one of the latter’s functions. What is described performs the description. In so doing it must therefore also describe itself. It must treat its subject as one that describes itself. Borrowing an expression from logical analysis in linguistics, we could say that every theory of society must have an “autological” component. Whoever feels that the theory of science cannot accommodate this must do without a theory of society, linguistics, and much else.

Classical sociology has sought to establish itself as the science of social facts—facts as opposed to mere opinions, value judgments, or ideological prejudices. Within the context of this distinction, this is not to be disputed. The problem, however, is that the ascertainment of facts can enter the world only as fact. Sociology therefore has to take account of its own factuality. This requirement applies throughout its domain of research and is not to be redeemed by a special interest in a “sociology of sociology.” This, as we now know, violates the premises of a bivalent, or two-valued, logic. In choosing limited research topics, this can be disregarded on pragmatic grounds. The investigator sees himself as a subject outside his topic. For the purposes of a theory of society, however, this view is untenable, for the work on such a theory necessarily involves self-referential operations. It can be communicated only within the system of society.

Sociology has hitherto failed to address this problem with the necessary stringency and consistency. It has hence failed to produce anything approaching an adequate theory of society. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, any integration of a description of society into its object tended to be seen as “ideology” and, as such, rejected. On this basis, the raising of sociology to the academic status of a strict science would have been inconceivable. Some even felt they should make do without the concept of society and limit themselves to the strictly formal analysis of social relations. Concepts concerned with difference such as individualization and differentiation seemed sufficient to mark the research interests of sociology. Others, notably Emile Durkheim, considered a strictly positive science of “social facts” and of society as the condition for their possibility to be feasible. Still others were satisfied with the distinction between the natural sciences and the humanities and with the historical relativization of all descriptions of society. Whatever the details, the distinction between subject and object was considered binding for epistemological reasons, leaving a choice only between a scientistically naïve and a transcendental theoretical position.

Many of the peculiarities of what are now classical sociologies must be attributed to the limitations of this selection schema and to efforts to get by nonetheless. This can be said of the strange links between transcendentalism and social psychology we find in Georg Simmel. And of Max Weber’s value theoretical concept of action, a loan from Neo-Kantianism. It is also true of Helmut Schelsky’s call for a “transcendental theory of society” beyond the reach of normal empirical methods, which, attaching the concept of “transcendental” to the individual subject, made no headway. These positions are now interesting at best for interpreting the classics. In spite of this unquestioned commitment to the subject/object schema and despite the insoluble problem of its subject matter, classical sociology has produced the only description of society to date. This perhaps best explains the lasting fascination the sociological classics continue to exert, which in a strict sense has made seemingly timeless texts of them. Almost all theoretical endeavors today are concerned with retrospection and reconstruction. It is well worth considering what made this success possible.

Without acknowledging a circular relationship with the subject matter! That much can be said. The solution, which hid the problem from the classics, lay in a historical self-location, in the dissolution of the circle by a historical difference in which the theory could define itself historically (and only historically). Nascent sociology had reacted to the structural and semantic problems that had arisen in the nineteenth century, and was aware of having done so. Even where it expressed concepts in abstract terms, they owed their plausibility to the historical situation. The end of confidence in progress had to be accepted; a belief in the positive nature of development at whatever cost was replaced by structural analysis, above all, by analysis of social differentiation, organizational dependencies, and role structures. The economy-focused (“political economy”) concept of society that had held sway since the final decades of the eighteenth century could thus be abandoned. This provoked controversy between those who defined society in material (economic) terms and those who adopted a more intellectual (cultural) approach. At the same time, the position of the individual in modern society became the central problem, a referential problem, so to speak, inviting a skeptical view of society as a whole, which could no longer automatically be considered progressive. Concepts such as socialization and role signaled the need for theoretical mediation between the “individual” and “society.” Together with the historical difference, this distinction between “individual” and “society” provided a basis for theory formation. But, as in the case of history, this context could not accommodate the question of the distinction’s unity. To ask what history is was ruled out methodologically, and what constituted the unity of the difference between individual and society was not even recognized as a problem, because, in keeping with the entire tradition, society was assumed to be composed of individuals. This was then the basis for a “critical” analysis of society, which was not to be “deconstructed” by questions about the unity of the difference between individual and society. In Max Weber, finally, the skepticism such a theoretical approach permitted went so far as to affect assessment of modern Western rationalism. Nor should it be forgotten that a literature arose at the same time that demonstrated that neither within nor outside society does the modern individual find a secure basis for self-observation, self-realization, or, to use the fashionable term, “identity.” It suffices here to mention Flaubert, Mallarmé, Henry Adams, and Antonin Artaud.

Since the classics, sociology has made no progress worth mentioning toward a theory of society in the course of the past 100 years or so. Following the unwelcome ideology dispute of the nineteenth century, the paradox of communication about society in society was addressed in theoretical controversy by such oppositions as structuralist/processualist, domination/ conflict, affirmative/critical, and even conservative/progressive. However, since maintaining a position within such “frames” required confrontation with the contrary position and thus the inclusion of exclusion, opting for one side rather than the other was always infected with paradox, and to unfold paradox through controversy was convincing only where it made political sense. Given the inherent dynamism of the political system, this has proved less and less convincing, even though intellectuals have continued to play such games. There is no denying that sociology has achieved much in other fields, both methodologically and theoretically and especially in the collection of empirical knowledge; but it has, so to speak, omitted to describe society as a whole. This presumably has to do with its commitment to the subject/object distinction. There has indeed been specific research into a “sociology of sociology,” and a sort of “reflexive” sociology of science has recently emerged. Problems of self-reference arise in such contexts, but they are, as it were, isolated as special phenomena and treated as peculiarities or methodological difficulties. The same can be said of the “self-fulfilling prophecy” trope.

The only systematic sociological theory currently available was elaborated by Talcott Parsons as a general theory of the action system. It provides a codification of classical sociological knowledge and a treatment of the conceptual understanding of action with the aid of cross-tabulation. But it fails to answer the question of cognitive self-implication, because it has nothing to say about the degree of congruence between analytical conceptualization and actual system formation. It merely postulates an “analytical realism,” thus reducing the problem of self-implication to a paradoxical formula. What it leaves out of account is that the cognition of social systems depends on social conditions, not only on account of its object, but also as cognition; indeed, the cognition (or definition or analysis) of actions are themselves actions. Parsons consequently does not himself occur in any of the many boxes of his own theory. And this is ultimately why the theory cannot distinguish systematically between social system and society; it only offers impressionistic, more or less feuilletonistic views of modern society.

In the long course of history, the description of human social life (for more ancient times, we can speak of “society” only with reservations) was guided by ideas insufficiently congruent with existing reality. This was true of the old European tradition, with its characteristic sense of the natural perfectibility of humankind and its pursuit of education and the forgiveness of sins. But it still holds true for modern Europe, for the Enlightenment and its double deity Reason and Critique. Even in the present century, this awareness of inadequacy has been kept alive (see Husserl or Habermas) and associated with the notion of modernity. Richard Münch still considers this focus on the tension between reason and reality to be a basic characteristic of modernity and an explanation for its distinctive dynamics. However, the sense of problem has now shifted from ideas to reality itself; and only now is sociology called upon. First, we have to under stand why society causes itself so many problems, even if we forgo any proposals for improvement (more solidarity, emancipation, reasoned agreement, social integration, etc.). Sociology must understand its relationship with society as one of learning, not instruction. It must analyze the problems it discovers, possibly postpone tackling them, possibly declare them insoluble, albeit without knowing how to proffer “scientifically proven” solutions. All this requires a theoretically grounded description of modern society.

If sociology has to admit to not having produced a theory of society in this format, how can it explain this failure to perform a task so clearly within its purview and of such importance for its standing in society?

It can obviously be argued that society is immensely complex, and that a practicable methodology for dealing with highly complex and differentiated systems (so-called organized complexity) is lacking. This argument is all the more weighty if we point out that the description of the system is part of the system, and that there can be a plurality of such descriptions. The conventional methodology, which operates on a very small scale or under conditions appropriate for statistical analysis, is particularly unsuited for “hypercomplex” systems of this sort. But this argument necessarily prompts renunciation of a theory of society and restricts efforts to develop methods for dealing with highly complex or even hypercomplex systems. But this has been done anyway, although with little success, since the discovery of the methodological problem some fifty years ago.

Another consideration might be headed “epistemological obstacles” (“obstacles épistémologiques,” a term coined by Gaston Bachelard), referring to burdens of tradition that prevent adequate scientific analysis and raise expectations that can neither be met nor, despite these evident weaknesses, replaced. Tradition might be said to have responded to natural questions, and therefore to have provided largely convincing answers. As science evolved, however, these natural questions gave way to theory-dependent scientific problems whose solution could be judged only in the scientific context. In retrospect, the guiding principles of these obstacles épistémologiques are insufficiently complex; they overestimate themselves and result in a uniformization of the object matter that is finally no longer convincing. Not only have the answers we now require become more difficult (more contingent, more improbable, less convincing); extant questions and answers obstruct further development, which has to detour via implausible evidence.

Such epistemological obstacles are to be found in the prevailing understanding of society in the form of four interconnected, mutually reinforcing assumptions:

(1) that society consists of actual people and relations between people ( 2) that society is constituted or at least integrated by consensus among human beings, by concordant opinion and complementary purpose

(3) that societies are regional, territorially defined entities, so that Brazil as a society differs from Thailand, and the united States from Russia, as does Uruguay from Paraguay

(4) that societies, like groups of people and like territories, can be observed from outside

Assumptions 1 to 3 prevent precise conceptual definition of the subject “society.” The “human being” (as opposed to animals) was traditionally described on the basis of distinctions (such as reason, intelligence, will, imagination, emotion, morality), received ideas that, although revised, were specified neither empirically nor in their mode of operation. These distinctions seemed to suffice for mutual clarification, but their neurophysiological basis remained unclear. In particular, these “anthropological” concepts offer no possibility for connecting with the psychic/ social distinction. The difficulties grow if we abandon these distinctions in favor of scientific and empirical denotability. The problematization of human individuality with regard to the nature of the individual’s associations and affective development began in about the mid-eighteenth century, long before the industrial revolution. This exploded the traditional positioning of the human being in an order that gave him status and a way of life. Instead, the relationship between the individual and society became a problem. However traditional concepts, especially “reason” are maintained, it is clear that not everything that individuates the human being (if anything at all about him) belongs to society. Society does not weigh exactly as much as all human beings taken together, nor does its weight change with every birth and death. It is not reproduced, for example, by an exchange of macro molecules in the individual cells of a person or by the exchange of cells in the organisms of individual human beings. It is therefore not alive. Nor would anyone seriously regard neurophysiological processes in the brain inaccessible to consciousness as societal processes, and the same is true of all perceptions and trains of thought occupying the attention of the individual consciousness at a given time. Georg Simmel, who attributed this problem to modern individualism, preferred in the circumstances to sacrifice the concept of society rather than his sociological interest in individuals. Aggregate concepts, as he saw the problem, were questionable and should be replaced by relational theories. After all, he pointed out, astronomy was not a theory of the “starry sky.”

If it is no longer obvious that society by its nature comprises actual human beings whose solidarity is prescribed as ordinata concordia [well-ordered concord] and in particular as ordinata caritas [well-ordered love], a theory of consensus can step in with a substitute concept. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this led to the resuscitation and radicalization of the theory of social contract. At least in Hobbes, the concept of nature is reduced to the extrasocial domain, in other authors (such as Pufendorf) to an inclination for contract formation. However, this theory soon had to be abandoned. It was a legally circular construction and thus unable to explain the absolute and permanent binding force of the contract; and, in the light of rapidly growing historical knowledge, it could be handled historically only as a fiction without explanatory value. It was superseded in the nineteenth century by consensus theories and by a notion of solidarity and integration on the basis of consensus. Finally, in still weaker dilution, “legitimacy” was demanded for institutions able to impose order even in the absence of consensus, and therefore against resistance. Thus, with Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, sociology begins. Despite all concessions to reality, integration on the basis of consensus has remained the principle by which society is identified as an entity—one might say as an “individual.”

(Continues…)

Excerpted from THEORY OF SOCIETYby Niklas Luhmann Excerpted by permission of STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.