The Second Palestinian Intifada

A Chronicle of a People's Struggle

By Ramzy Baroud, Mahfouz Abu Turk, Matthew Cassel

Pluto Press

Copyright © 2006 Ramzy Baroud
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-7453-2547-7

Contents

Foreword by Kathleen and Bill Christison, viii,
Preface, xiii,
Acknowledgements, xvii,
Introduction by Jennifer Loewenstein, 1,
1 The Intifada Takes Off (2000-01), 16,
2 Intifada International (2002), 36,
3 Calls for Reform (2003), 53,
4 Profound Changes, Insurmountable Challenges (2004), 90,
5 End of the Intifada? (2005), 120,
Epilogue, 158,
Appendix I Total Deaths and Other Losses During the Second Palestinian Uprising, 166,
Appendix II Timeline of Events During the Second Palestinian Uprising: 2000-05, 168,
Notes, 196,
Recommended Reading, 207,
Notes on Contributors, 208,
Index, 210,

CHAPTER 1

The Intifada Takes Off (2000-01)

This chapter highlights some of the events which take place just months before the outbreak of the Second Palestinian Uprising, as well as the events of its first year. It explores how the Israeli army employs tactics of provocation — from fortifying settlements to invading refugee camps — in an attempt to show the Palestinians that the May 2000 retreat from South Lebanon, after 22 years of uninterrupted occupation, will not be a precedent. Talks at Camp David also commence, where Barak's famous "generous offer" is purportedly presented and subsequently snubbed by the Palestinian delegation. This becomes a monumental turning-point, with the Israelis and Americans jointly declaring that there is no hope for a bilateral peace agreement with Palestinians. Shortly thereafter, Sharon executes his contentious visit to Haram al-Sharif — an event that signifies the breaking point for Palestinians and instigates the onset of the five-year-long Intifada. Sharon is soon elected Prime Minister of Israel and unveils his new plan of targeted assassinations of Palestinian activists, a plan that will claim the lives of hundreds over the next five years. The extradition of Slobodan Milosevic highlights the limitations and double standards of international law, and the question is raised whether Israel will ever be held accountable to the same edicts. Finally, the tragedy of September 11 not only shocks the world, but profoundly changes the political landscape in the Middle East, the ramifications of which are intimately felt among Palestinians.

LESSONS FROM DEFEAT

Some would argue that the birth of the Second Palestinian Uprising was actually rooted in the south of Lebanon. After the long and cruel uprising from 1987-93, empty promises, meaningless summits, and equally barren accords had left Palestinians in a numbing impasse. Rumors circulated and were eventually confirmed when Israeli officials formally disclosed that weapons build-up was taking place within the settlements plaguing the Occupied Territories. Palestinians realized that perilous designs were being crafted in the midst of the stalemate. But to the north, a decades-long skirmish between the Israeli army and the resistance movement Hizbollah was finally coming to an end, with an assured and embarrassing defeat for the Israeli Defense Forces.

It was not until May 2000 that the Israeli army finally abandoned the gains of its precious victory in Lebanon. Nearly two decades of a war of attrition between the Israeli army and a few hundred Hizbollah resistance fighters went mostly unnoticed. It was hardly defined as a war, since it lacked the trappings of traditional combat. Nevertheless, the Lebanese resistance could claim a tangible Arab victory, after decades of humiliating defeats at the hands of the Israeli army — from Israel's so-called War of Independence in 1948, to the Six-Day War in 1967, and the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, to list some primary examples. The Lebanese resistance's triumph on the battlefield is one that Israel still denies.

Israel's then chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Shaul Mofaz, who oversaw Israel's retreat from Lebanon, warned soon after that Israel intended to deploy tanks and helicopters in the occupied West Bank and Gaza. The official claim was that violent clashes with Palestinians were causing the army concern such that the government was persuaded to send additional supplies to Jewish settlers, including sandbags and tear-gas canisters. Considering the injury inflicted on unarmed Palestinians over the years with Israel's conventional "antiriot" gear (automatic rifles, military jeeps, and tear gas), was this sudden and extreme build-up necessary? Was there any imperative to deploy heavy weaponry to combat youth, women, and children? In the midst of Israel's military build-up, Palestinian Authority officials asserted that Israel was actually targeting the P.A., even though the primary targets were groups that outwardly refused the peace terms prescribed in the Oslo Accords, drafted secretly and without the consent of most Palestinians. The P.A.'s claim to being itself the target seemed unconvincing, if not absurd, considering that joint security coordination between Israeli forces and P.A. police was actively continued, to the indignation of most Palestinians. Such dual loyalty was fully demonstrated in Palestinian protests in May 2000, which were violently suppressed jointly by Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The deliberate killing of six unarmed Palestinians and the injuring of over 1000 was not enough to persuade the P.A. to reassess its allegiances to Israel in favor of an increasingly frustrated Palestinian populace. And while Israel's increasingly violent aggressions failed to persuade the P.A. to rethink its unconditional peace negotiation strategy, it was Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak who ordered his negotiation team home, in protest at the wounding of an Israeli toddler.

Concurrently, Barak, who was dubbed a "dove" by Israeli and American political commentators, was putting himself on friendlier terms with radical Jewish settlers who were occupying 145 thriving settlements in the West Bank. These settlers, who had for long been granted participation in suppressing Palestinian protests, had worked alongside Israeli forces for years. A statement issued by Barak's office on June 21 said that Barak instructed his ministers to meet with leaders of the settlement movement regularly, lauding them as "good citizens" with an important role in defending Israel. Barak's softer tone with the settlers was a direct concession to their grievances over his wishy-washy policies, i.e. the policy of dialogue with the Palestinians. But Barak's open disregard for Palestinians' rights, and his insistence on retaining major settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, left little doubt regarding his real intentions. Furthermore, the new alliances which were in the process of being formed, coupled with Barak's growing obsession with fortifying the settlements by deploying heavy military equipment, would likely further expose his not so dove-like demeanor. This military build-up reflected Israel's realization that a Palestinian revolt against the occupation, solidified by the P.A.'s unreserved collaboration, was imminent. The fact that the Israelis were openly pursuing these militaristic policies, at a time when Israel was purportedly eager to produce a framework for a "final status agreement" with the Palestinian leadership, is telling to say the least. However, there was more to Israel's military escalation than just this. Israel's defeat in Lebanon strengthened...