Pirates, Terrorists, And Warlords

The History, Influence, and Future of Armed Groups Around the World

By Jeffrey H. Norwitz

Skyhorse Publishing

Copyright © 2009 Jeffrey H. Norwitz
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-60239-708-8

Contents

Title Page,
Copyright Page,
Dedication,
INTRODUCTION,
Part One – HISTORY AND ARMED GROUPS,
Chapter 1 – Pirates, Vikings, and Teutonic Knights,
Chapter 2 – The Italian Red Brigades (1969-1984): Political Revolution and Threats to the State,
Chapter 3 – Armed Conflict in Cambodia and the UN Response,
Chapter 4 – Armed Groups and Diplomacy: East Timor’s FRETILIN Guerrillas,
Chapter 5 – Adapting to a Changing Environment — The Irish Republican Army as an Armed Group,
Chapter 6 – Pseudo Operations — A Double-Edged Sword of Counterinsurgency,
Part Two – PRESENT CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT,
Chapter 7 – The Threat to the Maritime Domain: How Real is the Terrorist Threat?,
Chapter 8 – Armed Groups and the Law,
Chapter 9 – Globalization and the Transformation of Armed Groups,
Chapter 10 – Is It Possible to Deter Armed Groups?,
Chapter 11 – Sanctuary: The Geopolitics of Terrorism and Insurgency,
Chapter 12 – Small Wars Are Local: Questioning Assumptions about Armed Groups,
Chapter 13 – Piracy and the Exploitation of Sanctuary,
Chapter 14 – Domestic Terrorism: Forgotten, But Not Gone,
Chapter 15 – The Threat of Armed Street Gangs in America,
Chapter 16 – Prosecuting Homegrown Extremists: Case Study of the Virginia “Paintball Jihad” Cell,
Part Three – RELIGION AS INSPIRATION,
Chapter 17 – Armed with the Power of Religion: Not Just a War of Ideas,
Chapter 18 – Arming for Armageddon: Myths and Motivations of Violence in American Christian Apocalypticism,
Chapter 19 – Glory in Defeat and Other Islamist Ideologies,
Part Four – THINKING DIFFERENTLY ABOUT ARMED GROUPS,
Chapter 20 – The Erosion of Constraints in Armed-Group Warfare: Bloody Tactics and Vulnerable Targets,
Chapter 21 – Knowledge Transfer and Shared Learning among Armed Groups,
Chapter 22 – The “Memory of War”: Tribes and the Legitimate Use of Force in Iraq,
Chapter 23 – Terrorist or Freedom Fighter? Tyrant or Guardian?,
Chapter 24 – Disrupting and Influencing Leaders of Armed Groups,
Chapter 25 – Armed Groups through the Lens of Anthropology,
Part Five – THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME,
Chapter 26 – Children on the Battlefield: The Breakdown of Moral Norms,
Chapter 27 – The “New Silk Road” of Terrorism and Organized Crime: The Key to Countering the Terror-Crime Nexus,
Chapter 28 – Shari’a Financing and the Coming Ummah,
Chapter 29 – Terrorism as an International Security Problem,
Chapter 30 – Takin’ It to the Streets: Hydra Networks, Chaos Strategies, and the “New” Asymmetry,
Chapter 31 – Virtual Sanctuary Enables Global Insurgency,
Chapter 32 – Armed Groups: Changing the Rules,
Appendix – United Nations Guidelines on Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups,

CHAPTER 1

Pirates, Vikings, and Teutonic Knights

Peter T. Underwood

Armed groups not directly springing from governmental authority, such as military and police forces, fall into three basic categories along a spectrum, ranging from poorly organized, disjointed, and motivated by greed, to highly organized, coordinated, and motivated by ideology. Recognizing where any particular group falls on this spectrum can help explain how and why the group behaves as it does. This in turn will aid in determining how to effectively deal with these groups.

At one end of the spectrum are criminals, motivated by the simple prospect of plunder. At the other end are ideologues, driven by strong motives and seeking to change political and social conditions. Occupying the middle ground are groups in transition. Still motivated by greed, at some point they “mature” and want a bigger stake in the political, social, and economic order. The group seeks the trappings of authority more closely associated with traditional political power.

Identifying where a particular group is on the spectrum is important in determining how we deal with it. While these categories often overlap in their purposes and motivations, a common thread is their inevitable connection to an established political power. Whether from a modern nation-state, feudal kingdom, or colonial empire, some form of support from an existing government, tacit or overt, is present if any of these groups moves beyond the stage of routine criminal annoyance or fanatical fringe element.

THE PIRATES

The first group on the spectrum has a long history. Its members are organized criminals. Pirates are a classic example. Their goal is money. They don’t want to change society or overthrow existing governments even though their actions may ultimately contribute to both. They simply want to prey on society and steal from others. In fact, their livelihood depends on the prosperity of the societies on which they prey. Since arguably their plunder comes from the wealth generated by productive societies, it is in their interest not to disrupt those societies to the point of decline or collapse. Pirates simply want to “skim the cream from the top.”

As criminals driven by profit, pirates are usually found taking the path of least resistance. From the ancient world to today, the lucrative, easily taken merchant vessel is their target. They rarely challenge an authoritative presence in any region. They desire to exploit the trade routes, not control them.

The struggle to control maritime trade is as old as seafaring itself. Yet the line between piracy and state-sponsored war was never clear in the ancient world until governments developed sufficient strength to actually police the seas. Until that point, piracy was not viewed as an illegal action but simply another form of armed conflict. Once governments developed sufficient power to build navies, or at least issue letters of marque, piracy could be, and was, declared an illegal activity. Pirates became lawbreakers, pure and simple.

Piracy follows well-defined cycles. Initially small groups attack weak merchants. As small groups gain wealth and grow in size and power, they absorb or drive off other, smaller groups, a pattern readily recognizable in other organized criminal groups. When sufficient power is gained and pirates become a genuine threat to a state’s stability, the sovereign will make a concerted effort to crush that threat. If the offensive is successful, piracy will return to a low level of annoyance. If not, pirates begin to be more than just criminal gangs.

In the modern world, the percentage of trade affected by piracy is insignificant when compared to the total volume and the associated profits of worldwide shipping interests. Most acts of piracy, if reported at all, suggest no pattern or logic other than random acts aimed at targets of opportunity. They are simply a criminal annoyance. However, in some regions, particularly Latin America, Africa, and Asia, there are signs of increased involvement by organized crime. There is evidence of the systematic targeting and seizure of whole vessels and their cargoes, followed by quick, efficient disposal. This implies a level of sophistication beyond the capability of small-scale criminal activity driven by mere opportunity and convenience. This pattern fits neatly with the previously identified cycle of piracy: small groups being absorbed by larger, more organized groups. Could such groups become regional threats?

In the past, pirate organizations have sometimes grown to such a scale that they in fact earned the privileges of governments, able to form alliances and treat with other governments. This process was invariably enabled by the support of existing political entities. In the ancient world, during periods of war and turmoil between existing states, opportunities for piracy grew as the warring factions turned a blind eye or even openly supported the predatory actions of pirates directed against their opponents. Starting a practice that endures today, city-states, kingdoms, and empires of the Mediterranean routinely supported piracy for their own political ends.

The wars between Rome and Carthage, followed by nearly a century of Roman civil war, saw piracy on the greatest scale in all antiquity. With no power able to adequately patrol the Mediterranean, pirates developed powerful strongholds. When King Mithradates of Pontus allied himself with pirates, acting as their protector and providing them with safe haven from the Romans, they became capable of advancing beyond random attacks against merchants and developed into naval organizations capable of coordinated action. They became so powerful that they threatened Rome, even raiding up the Tiber. In response, Rome undertook a campaign in 67 BCE, under Pompey the Great, to directly attack the pirate strongholds of Asia Minor. In addition to destroying the pirate lairs and absorbing Mithradates’ kingdom into the empire, Pompey swept the pirate fleets from the sea, making commerce safe for centuries to come. Nevertheless, Rome’s power weakened eventually. With Rome gone, piracy once again emerged.

The chaos of the Middle Ages proved profitable for pirates. By the thirteenth century, the cycle began to repeat itself. North Sea pirate bands grew so powerful that they decisively influenced events in the region for 200 years. The pirate Eustace the Monk, a mercenary willing to sell his services to the highest bidder, controlled a fleet so strong that it dominated the English Channel. From 1205-12, he sold his services to King John of England, plundering and raiding up the Seine. For this, the English monarch gave him letters of protection and royal gifts. With the king’s blessing, Eustace even built a palatial residence in London. King John gave this largesse despite the fact that he simultaneously outlawed Eustace, who was plundering English vessels as well as French. When the time and price proved right, Eustace switched his services to the French king Philip and began massing a fleet large enough to invade England.

Eustace and his pirate band suddenly became more than criminals. They were genuine threats to the safety and security of the existing order. The king and the merchants of the English Cinque Ports pooled their resources and crushed Eustace in 1217 once they realized that they could lose everything, and not just a percentage of their profits.

The pirate threat was far from eliminated. Pirates continued to be powerful actors in the region, consistently with the support of existing states. From the thirteenth to the fifteenth century, the Hanseatic League, an association of merchant cities, was formed largely to protect their trade from pirates. Yet, in a fashion similar to the sparring French and English monarchs, the league encouraged pirates to prey on rivals and allied itself with pirates when warring with the Danish king.

The European powers continued to foster piracy well into the early modern era. Muslim pirates, the Moors or Barbary pirates, became so powerful that in 1534, under the leadership of Khayr ad-Din Barbarossa, they seized Tunis and openly challenged Charles V. Though defeated by the Italian admiral Andrea Doria, Barbarossa’s skills as a pirate remained useful to the regional powers. Appointed by the Ottoman sultan as governor of North Africa, he commanded the sultan’s fleet sent to support Francis I, king of France. In support of Valois and Ottoman ambitions, Barbarossa plundered the Italian possessions of the Hapsburgs. Ultimately, these pirates accrued such power and status within the Ottoman Empire that they became the relatively independent Barbary States, political entities that would continue as significant regional powers well into the eighteenth century.

These examples have a connecting thread. All three illustrate that when tolerated by existing governments and given tacit support, criminal activity, in this case piracy, can grow to the point that it becomes a genuine threat to regional stability. However, when not tolerated, such activity has difficulty in rising above the level of criminal annoyance. These examples also illustrate the gradual movement from poorly organized criminal activities motivated by the prospect of plunder to highly organized entities that gradually become regional power brokers or, as in the case of the Barbary pirates, regional powers with governmental authority.

THE VIKINGS

This evolution beyond the desire for mere plunder is also illustrated by the second group, the Vikings, who occupy the midrange on the scale, somewhere between simple criminals and their opposites, religious zealots. Usually characterized as fierce pirates focused on rapine and plunder, the Vikings were always more than that. With their own unique culture, sense of government, and commerce bolstered by a need to colonize, the Vikings were never representatives of society’s criminal element nor were they religious proselytizers seeking to change the cultures they invaded. They eventually merged with the societies they were looting, became a part of them, adopted their religion, and accepted their customs while, at the same time, spreading their own unique traits and trademarks.

While they were frequently bought off with tribute, when forcefully challenged, as they were in England by Alfred the Great, they continued to engage in piracy but were prevented from gaining sufficient power to displace or supplant the reigning government. As their raids became annual events, they began marrying the locals and remaining behind. Forming their own communities, they eventually became parts of the local cultures, leaving their own mark to be sure, but absorbing religious, artistic, and administrative influences from their former victims. Their incursions into the Frankish empire of Charlemagne would follow a different course when by 919 they acquiesced to the authority of the Frankish throne.

In their role as marauding pirates, the Vikings were thoroughly professional. As with all pirates, they sought easy victims. The military power forged by the Holy Roman Emperor, Charlemagne, and bequeathed to his heirs, was formidable. The French coast proved a far more difficult military problem than had the English. The Vikings looked elsewhere for plunder. But the death of Charlemagne’s son Louis brought an internal struggle for power that resulted in the empire’s division by the Treaty of Verdun in 843. This internal struggle for power saw the coastal defenses of the newly divided and weakened kingdom ignored and fatally weakened. As a result, the Vikings returned.

In 860 the Vikings began to systematically advance up the Seine valley during their annual campaigns. Similar to their practice in England, many of the Viking bands wintered over in France rather than return home at the end of the campaigning season. One such group, led by Weland, was particularly large and powerful. The increasingly hard-pressed French king, Charles the Bald, procured his services as a mercenary. In return for payments from Charles, Weland began to eject other Viking bands and protect the region from all interlopers. In short order, Charles’s payments took the form of danegeld, mandatory “protection” money. The Vikings were in France to stay. Over the next 50 years, the thirst for land replaced the thirst for gold. The Viking camps became larger, more numerous, and more permanent. With the grudging acquiescence of the French kings, northern France became, in effect, an independent Viking colony.

In the first decade of the tenth century, the Viking chieftain Rollo achieved such power in the Seine valley that the French king, Charles the Simple, could not challenge him as he looked covetously toward the Île de France. Recognizing the reality that the balance of power had irrevocably shifted, Charles the Simple simply gave Normandy to Rollo. At Saint-Clair-sur-Epte in 911, Rollo became the first duke of Normandy. The agreement gave Rollo the land he wanted in exchange for his allegiance to Charles. Charles got a buffer against further depredations as well as a vassal, subject to his will, at least in theory.

Following the division of Charlemagne’s empire, the French kings never had the power to completely repulse the Vikings. But once they began to use them to achieve their own political objectives, it only became a matter of time before the Vikings evolved from seasonal raiders to a military and political force that had to be recognized and treated as a legitimate power. Once again, the tolerance of an existing government, however grudgingly given, proved a key element in the Normans’ rise to power. What had been a wide-ranging group of pirate raiders achieved political legitimacy and became a regional power influencing events for decades.

THE TEUTONIC KNIGHTS

Occupying the opposite end of the scale from ordinary criminal gangs are organizations that are motivated by ideology, are armed with significant military capability, and possess organizational infrastructures capable of implementing their ideological visions. Such armed groups are formidable. While the modern world seems to have no shortage of ideological zealots, even a cursory look at the past shows we have never suffered from such a shortage. One such group, bent on religious conversion through colonization and conquest, was the Teutonic Knights.

The Teutonic Knights of Saint Mary’s Hospital of Jerusalem were crusaders. A military order founded in the Holy Land in 1198, they represented the religious spirit of their times. Hardly limited to the Holy Land, the proselytizing zeal of crusaders propelled their banners throughout the Christian world from Spain to Russia. Nor were their efforts confined to Muslims. Pagans, heretics of every ilk, and, not surprisingly, Christians that were political opponents: all saw the shadow of the Knights’ flags and felt the steel of their swords. Born of and nurtured by religious fervor, the Teutonic Knights made their greatest imprint in the Baltic.

The crusading tradition ran deep in northern Europe as Christians expanded into heathen lands. As early as 1147, Saint Bernard proposed an expedition across the Elbe. The goal was colonization. This had great appeal to the Teutons’ thirst for land. But professional priests always led the Baltic Crusades. Equally important as new land was the goal of gaining new converts for the church. This imparted a righteousness to their ventures. By converting new souls to their version of the “true religion,” they justified their acts as acceptable to God. But their ventures also implied colonization. It thus had great appeal to the Teutons’ thirst for land. In this particular period of history, the expansion of Christian faith was often hard to separate from the increase in trade and economic power, which was in turn furthered by military power resulting in political power.

(Continues…)Excerpted from Pirates, Terrorists, And Warlords by Jeffrey H. Norwitz. Copyright © 2009 Jeffrey H. Norwitz. Excerpted by permission of Skyhorse Publishing.
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