Jeffrey G. Barlow has been a historian in the Contemporary History Branch of the Naval Historical Center since 1987. He is the author of Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945-1950, co-winner of the John Lyman Book Award for Naval History from the North American Society for Oceanic History in 1995.

From HOT WAR to COLD

The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945-1955By Jeffrey G. Barlow

Stanford University Press

Copyright © 2009 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University
All right reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8047-5666-2

Contents

Acknowledgments…………………………………………………………………………..ixA Note on Transliteration………………………………………………………………….xiiiIntroduction……………………………………………………………………………..11. Wartime Organizational Changes in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations…………………92. Initial Challenges: Postwar and Demobilization Planning…………………………………….353. The Navy and Unification………………………………………………………………..574. The National Security Act Achieved……………………………………………………….745. Preparing for a New Enemy……………………………………………………………….966. War Ends in the Pacific…………………………………………………………………1187. Troubles Emerge in Postwar China, 1945-1946……………………………………………….1378. Assessing and Responding to the Soviet Naval Threat………………………………………..1609. Adjusting to the National Military Establishment…………………………………………..17510. Living in “Interesting Times”…………………………………………………………..19911. Slugging It Out on Capitol Hill…………………………………………………………21912. Events in the Western Pacific…………………………………………………………..24113. Troubles on the Korean Peninsula………………………………………………………..25914. Deciding to Fight……………………………………………………………………..28015. Defending NATO Europe: Planning During the Initial Stages………………………………….30016. The Eisenhower National Security Structure……………………………………………….32717. Rethinking National Strategy……………………………………………………………34918. Coping with the New Look……………………………………………………………….36419. A Crisis Abroad and a CNO’s Departure……………………………………………………381Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………….403Abbreviations…………………………………………………………………………….409Notes……………………………………………………………………………………417Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………..617Index……………………………………………………………………………………683

Chapter One

Wartime Organizational Changes in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

* * *

At 0900 on 2 September 1945, at a mess table placed on the starboard veranda deck of the battleship Missouri (BB 63) anchored in Tokyo Bay, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur opened the ceremony at which the Imperial Government of Japan surrendered to the Allied Powers. Four minutes later, at 0904, Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru signed the instrument of surrender, bringing the Second World War-a war of unparalleled scope and horror-officially to a close.

The many observers to the scene on board Missouri could look across Tokyo Bay and see it filled with Allied men-of-war and auxiliaries of almost every type and size from capital ships to landing ships and craft. For U.S. Navy officers in attendance, the surrender ceremony in the presence of so much naval might proved a moving occasion. Just as the surrender formalities concluded, American aircraft in massed formations began a flyover of the bay. Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., Commander Third Fleet, recalled:

I had been called up to stand behind the chair while [Fleet Admiral] Chester [W.] Nimitz was signing for the United States. We had a mass flight of about 400 planes from Task Force 38 in the offing, waiting to come over the MISSOURI at my command. I had asked General MacArthur to please give me the word when he wanted them brought over. He whispered in my ear, “Start ’em now.” The word was passed over the radio phone to the flight and they made a beautiful and impressive sight as they came over the ships.

On this propitious day, the United States Navy stood at the zenith of its wartime strength-naval power that is difficult to comprehend fully in the early 21st century. As Britain’s Royal Navy had stood astride the world’s oceans as the supreme naval power in November 1918, so now the U.S. Navy was supreme. Having fought in the varied theaters of the war-in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean in collaboration with its British and Canadian counterparts, in the Pacific, largely alone-it had suffered serious initial losses, had learned from many of its mistakes, and ultimately had triumphed against German and Japanese navies that had fought with considerable skill and courage.

The U.S. Navy possessed 1,166 major combatant ships on VJ day, including 23 battleships, 28 aircraft carriers (CVs and CVLs), 71 escort carriers, 73 cruisers, 380 destroyers, and 234 submarines. It was a fleet the power of which surpassed that of any navy the world had yet seen. Nonetheless, it was suddenly a wasting asset in the new days of peace stretching ahead, and within a few months it would be reduced to a fraction of its fighting strength by the effects of demobilization. This sudden turn from war to peace was conveyed aptly by the words of Admiral Nimitz, which were transmitted by radio throughout the Pacific and the United States following the surrender ceremony, “Now we turn to the great tasks of reconstruction and restoration.”

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

In December 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations was Admiral Harold R. “Betty” Stark. A 1903 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy who had risen in the service as a line officer with a specialty in ordnance, he had commanded four destroyers in succession from 1909 to 1915. In the interwar period as a member of the “Gun Club” (an appellation given to those who specialized in ordnance and gunnery), Stark had held a variety of responsible positions, including serving as an aide to Navy Secretaries Charles Francis Adams and Claude A. Swanson. After commanding the battleship West Virginia (BB 48), he had spent almost three years as Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance (BUORD).

In early 1939, Admiral William Leahy had only a few months remaining in his term as CNO. Accordingly, Secretary of the Navy Swanson submitted five possible slates for new flag officer assignments to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. One of these combinations had Rear Admiral James O. Richardson, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, for CNO, while another had Rear Admiral Stark in that position. President Roosevelt eventually decided on a slate that had Stark as CNO and Richardson as Commander Battle Force (to fleet up to Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet after six months). On 22 March 1939, the President wrote to Stark, whom he had known since Roosevelt’s days as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, “It will be grand to have you here as C.N.O. As in the case of Bill Leahy, you and I talk the same language.” Admiral Stark assumed office as CNO on 1 August 1939. As CNO, Stark exhibited the same traits he had shown earlier in his career. Innately modest and considerate of his subordinates, he possessed a great capacity for hard work. His tact and political sensitivity, gained during his tours as a naval aide and as BUORD chief, made him an effective advocate of the Navy in the White House and in testifying before Congress.

By regulation, the Chief of Naval Operations, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, was charged with “the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war.” The CNO’s duties included the direction of all strategic and tactical matters, organization of the fleet, maneuvers, gunnery competitions, drills and exercises, and the training of the fleet for war. Under the Secretary’s direction, the CNO also was responsible for directing “the movements and operations of vessels of the Navy, including the time of their assignment for docking, repairs, and alterations …”

In late 1941, the most serious concern over the role of the Chief of Naval Operations continued to be his relationship with the technical bureaus and the independent offices in the Navy Department. The CNO took precedence over the Navy Department’s bureau chiefs and the heads of its independent offices by virtue of his rank, yet he was not their superior and was not a link in the chain of command between the chiefs and the Secretary of the Navy. Even though the CNO possessed important coordinative powers over all naval activities by virtue of his authority to operate the fleet in peace and war, this coordination had to be effected through careful and patient effort at achieving cooperation with the bureaus.

The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations-formerly the Office of Naval Operations-consisted of the immediate office of the CNO and eleven divisions in December 1941.15 These divisions included War Plans (Op-12), Central (Op-13), Naval Intelligence (Op-16), Communication (Op-20), Fleet Training (Op-22), and Ship Movements (Op-38).

The CNO, the Personal Aide to the CNO, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations were part of the immediate office of the Chief of Naval Operations, along with certain other officers who were assigned administrative duties. The Assistant CNO was next in authority to the CNO, serving in a manner similar to a chief of staff to a fleet commander in chief, relieving the Chief of Naval Operations of administrative details and considering all questions of administration or policy proposed by the OPNAV division directors before such matters were referred to the CNO.

The War Plans Division in late 1941 was divided into three sections-the Policy and Projects Section, the Plans Section, and the Latin American Defense Section. The Policy and Projects Section was responsible for developing policies and projects in support of war plans and for collaborating with the War Department in preparation of current plans for joint action of the Army and Navy. The Plans Section’s responsibilities included the direction of war planning, the preparation of designated war plans, and collaboration with the War Department in preparation of Joint Basic War Plans.

One of the division’s most influential activities in the last years before World War II was its preparation of the Annual Estimate of the Situation, which specified in some detail “the yearly degree of progress to be made in many of the ‘Standards of Readiness’ in the War Plans.” By the late 1930s, the Navy’s budgetary planning flowed directly from the Annual Estimate. In addition to his OPNAV responsibilities, the director of the War Plans Division served as a member of the Joint Board, the Army-Navy body that met to discuss and reach common understandings on issues requiring cooperation between the two services.

The Central Division, which was under the Assistant CNO, served largely as an immediate staff for the CNO “for coordination of effort with respect to policy and current plans.” Its duties included handling matters of international affairs (including treaties), legislation, regulations and organization, and reports and statements, such as the CNO’s annual report. By virtue of its international affairs responsibilities, the Central Division served as OPNAV’s liaison with the State Department.

The Naval Intelligence Division collected, evaluated, and disseminated information pertaining to the political, military, naval, economical, and industrial policies and conditions of the United States and foreign countries, and with the preservation of this information for ready reference and historical purposes. The division’s intelligence responsibilities were limited in two respects, however. It had no responsibility for radio intelligence, which fell under the cognizance of the Communications Division. Also, on oral instructions from the CNO, the division had no responsibility for evaluating or disseminating certain important aspects of military intelligence, such as preparing analyses of enemy intentions (i.e., developing the “Enemy Intentions” section of the Estimate of the Situation). Intelligence evaluation was a de facto prerogative that the War Plans Division jealously guarded in late 1941.

The Communications Division had control over naval communications by all means, including radio, telegraph, telephone, cable, and visual signals. It was also responsible for radio intelligence and security-its Communication Security Section was in charge of preparing and issuing codes, ciphers, and signal books for the Navy. In late 1941, however, the interception, decryption, and analysis of foreign radio communications were perhaps the most important of the Division’s responsibilities.

The Fleet Training Division embraced all phases of fleet training, including fleet exercises and gunnery and engineering competitions. Its Tactics Section was headed by the assistant director of the division. Among its responsibilities were the preparation of general instructions for the conduct of fleet problems, special fleet tactical exercises, and fleet landing exercises. It also prepared and revised tactical publications issued by the CNO.

The Ship Movements Division was responsible for supervising and coordinating the movements of all naval craft and aircraft, except specially designated units exclusively for training and experimental purposes. It prepared and revised the Operating Force Plan and the Organization of the United States Naval Forces in accordance with the policy outlined by the War Plans Division and approved by the CNO. It also provided coordination within OPNAV of the U.S. Fleet employment plans.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES FLEET

In late December 1941, Admiral Ernest J. King took over as Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. Ernest King was a 1901 graduate of the Naval Academy who had stood fourth in his class of sixty-seven at graduation. During most of World War I King served on the staff of Admiral Henry T. Mayo, second in command, Atlantic Fleet, as aide and squadron engineer officer.

During the interwar period, King, until then a surface officer, gained experience (though not great technical skill) in both submarines and naval aviation. After attending submarine school at New London, Connecticut, then Captain King commanded Submarine Division Eleven. During a subsequent tour as commander of the Submarine Base at New London, he headed the successful salvage of the submarine S 51 (SS 162), sunk off Block Island in September 1925. In January 1927, King reported to Pensacola, Florida for flight training. He was designated a naval aviator in late May of that year, following completion of a shortened course of instruction given to senior officers. During the next decade, King’s aviation assignments included tours as Assistant Chief and later Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics (BUAER), commanding officer of the carrier Lexington (CV 2), Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, and Commander Aircraft, Battle Force. Following a tour on the General Board, which he thought would be his last active duty assignment, King was named Commander, Patrol Force U.S. Fleet in December 1940. This command was upgraded to the Atlantic Fleet in February 1941, and King fleeted up to full admiral as its commander in chief. He was serving in this position when named COMINCH.

King’s personality proved a topic of discussion by seniors, contemporaries, and juniors alike throughout his career. An extremely intelligent and strong-willed individual, King did not suffer fools gladly and exhibited little tact when dealing with many seniors and all juniors. In addition, his short temper exhibited itself with some frequency when subordinates failed to carry out duties to his satisfaction. As historian Robert Love commented, “On the job, he seemed always to be angry or annoyed.”

King’s stern personality may have been developed intentionally when he was a junior officer. However it had developed, though, King’s abrupt and demanding nature was a noticeable fixture of both the man and the officer long before he had risen to flag rank. Indeed, shortly after he took over as COMINCH, someone circulated a rumor that King had commented of himself, “When they get into trouble, they send for the sons-of-bitches.” The rumor was inaccurate, but King later acknowledged that he would have said it if he had thought of it.

COMINCH-DECEMBER 1941-MARCH 1942

On 14 December 1941, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox returned to Washington from a hurried trip to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, where he had obtained firsthand information on the damage that the Fleet had sustained in the Japanese attack. After inspecting the fleet, Knox concluded it was necessary to split the two command positions then held by Admiral Husband E. Kimmel-Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) and Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (CINCUS)-into separate flag officer assignments. Moreover, he was determined that Kimmel had to be relieved of all of his duties at Pearl. As Knox subsequently explained to the President, when he had questioned Kimmel about the Japanese attack, the admiral had admitted that he “did not expect it and had taken no adequate measures to meet it if it came.” Clearly, allowing him to continue as the Navy’s senior commander afloat would create a bad precedent. Roosevelt agreed. Frank Knox accordingly summoned Ernest King to Washington on the 15th.

The following morning Secretary Knox met with the admiral and informed him that Rear Admiral Chester Nimitz, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, would go out to Hawaii as the new Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, replacing Admiral Kimmel. Knox then told King that he was to become the new Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. After first demurring, King eventually accepted the assignment.

The admiral told the Secretary that his new assignment would require the resolution of certain matters. First, he believed that as CINCUS he would have to command the far-flung fleet from an office in Washington, rather than at sea as was the custom. Yet having both CINCUS and CNO physically present in the Navy Department building (Main Navy) could create added problems with the CNO over matters of jurisdiction and responsibility. King asked, therefore, that the parameters of his new position be formally defined. Knox agreed to this request and directed that two members of the General Board, Rear Admirals Walton R. Sexton and James Richardson, draft an executive order defining the position for the President to sign.

That afternoon, Knox, King, and Stark met with the President to discuss the change. During the meeting, King told FDR that there were several prerequisites for which he wanted the President’s approval before he would agree to take the job. One was a change in the acronym for Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet from CINCUS to COMINCH. Another thing that King requested was command authority over the Navy’s technical Bureaus. Roosevelt agreed to the first request but demurred on the second, saying that such a change would necessitate redrafting federal law. He did promise, however, to replace any Bureau chief who proved uncooperative with King. It being the best offer he could get on this vital point, King accepted the President’s assurances.

(Continues…)

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