The Economic Effects of Constitutions

“The authors have succeeded in producing an extraordinary book that will open up this field and be the definitive reference for many years to come.”–Roger B. Myerson, W. C. Norby Professor of Economics, University of Chicago

“This work is destined to be a much-read monograph on an important subject: how much we can learn from cross-sectional variation in certain constitutional rules across the world. It is much the best work on the issue to date.”–Timothy Besley, London School of Economics & Political Science

“Persson and Tabellini’s

& quot; Persson and Tabellini’s The Economic Effects of Constitutions beautifully complements their earlier Political Economics . This sequel defines and makes serious empirical progress on a broad research agenda for the complex issue of how constitutional statutes (from forms of government to electoral rules) shape policy outcomes (such as the size of the welfare state and the distribution of benefits). Written by two leading contributors to modern political economy, this stimulating and very readable book is essential for all those concerned with and involved in constitutional design.& quot; –Jean Tirole, IDEI, Toulouse

& quot; The authors have succeeded in producing an extraordinary book that will open up this field and be the definitive reference for many years to come.& quot; –Roger B. Myerson, W. C. Norby Professor of Economics, University of Chicago

& quot; This work is destined to be a much-read monograph on an important subject: how much we can learn from cross-sectional variation in certain constitutional rules across the world. It is much the best work on the issue to date.& quot; –Timothy Besley, London School of Economics & Political Science

” Persson and Tabellini’s “The Economic Effects of Constitutions” beautifully complements their earlier “Political Economics,” This sequel defines and makes serious empirical progress on a broad research agenda for the complex issue of how constitutional statutes (from forms of government to electoral rules) shape policy outcomes (such as the size of the welfare state and the distribution of benefits). Written by two leading contributors to modern political economy, this stimulating and very readable book is essential for all those concerned with and involved in constitutional design.” –Jean Tirole, IDEI, Toulouse

” The authors have succeeded in producing an extraordinary book that will open up this field and be the definitive reference for many years to come.” –Roger B. Myerson, W. C. Norby Professor of Economics, University of Chicago

” This work is destined to be a much-read monograph on an important subject: how much we can learn from cross-sectional variation in certain constitutional rules across the world. It is much the best work on the issue to date.” –Timothy Besley, London School of Economics & Political Science

–Roger B. Myerson, W. C. Norby Professor of Economics, University of Chicago

–Timothy Besley, London School of Economics & Political Science

“”The authors have succeeded in producing an extraordinary book that will open up this field and be the definitive reference for many years to come.”

Guido Tabellini is Professor of Economics at Bocconi University in Milan and President of the Innocenzo Gasparini Institute of Economic Research, also at Bocconi University.