Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions: Essays in Honour of Jose Casas Pardo

This extensive book explores in detail a wide range of topics within the public choice and constitutional political economy tradition, providing a comprehensive overview of current work across the field.

The expert contributions are underpinned by the notion of moving economic thinking away from the analysis of the logic of a situation given a set of well-established and well-enforced ‘rules of the game’, towards a deeper analysis of the logic behind the selection of the rules of the game themselves. Within this context, the theme of choice between rules (as well as the more conventional analysis within rules) across historical time and place, and in various thought experiments and conceptual situations, is explored in detail. Extensive case studies back theory with empirical evidence, and topics discussed include: the foundations of constitutional economics; constitutional political economy; political competition and voting; public choice and public policy; and extensions to public choice theory.

This stimulating book will prove a thought-provoking read for academics and both under- and post-graduate students in the fields of economics (particularly public choice and Austrian economics), public policy and political science.

Contributors: P. Bernholz, V.K. Borooah, G. Brennan, G. Brosio, J.M. Buchanan, F. Cabrillo, R.D. Congleton, G. Eusepi, S. Fedeli, M. Ferrero, S. Fitzpatrick, F. Forte, B.S. Frey, J. Helin, M.J. Holler, J.D. Montoro-Pons, S. Neckermann, H. Nurmi, M. Paldam, M.A. Puchades-Navarro, G.C. Romagnoli, P. Salmon, V.J. Vanberg, B.-A. Wickström