The Case for Gridlock: Democracy, Organized Power, and the Legal Foundations of American Government

In the interest of limiting the power of government, James Madison and the framers of the US Constitution created a system of political institutions notoriously resistant to policy change; it tends toward gridlock. Reformers chafe at the many ”veto points” available to organized interests to stifle policy change. This important, well-researched, provocative book demonstrates how progressive reformers sought to shift the power to shape policy from the legislative branch to the executive bureaucracy. Ethridge (Univ. of Wisconsin) argues that reformers viewed this as a strategy for limiting the power of ”special interests” to stymie policy change; beyond the reach of interest groups, technocrats in the bureaucracy would promote policy changes consistent withthe reformers goals. What the reformers failed to appreciate was, first, the ability of interest groups to infiltrate the bureaucracy and promote their interests, often in ways diametrically opposed to the reformers” intentions, and, second, the capacityof Congress to overcome the influence of groups and generate policy change. He argues that a return to the ”constitutional principle” of gridlock, in which special interests must compete in a legislative forum, presents the best means of promoting the p

Ethridge offers a good analysis of an overlooked topic…and its importance for public policy…. Persuasively challenge what most people believe about politics….deserves readers concerned about the origins and consequences of regulation in the United States.

Institutional complexity and slow decision making are rarely praised in academic accounts of the American political system, but Marcus Ethridge”s provocative new book The Case for Gridlock makes a strong argument that they ought to be. Clearly written and meticulously researched, The Case for Gridlock convincingly challenges the Progressives” assumption that organized interests are best controlled and public purposes are most likely to be accomplished when Congress is bypassed and administrative agencies set public policies. Adherence to the ”constitutional principle” embedded in the Framers” system of separation of powers, Ethridge observes, changes the way that organized interests shape their political objectives and makes it more likely that the public interest will be advanced. Challenging fundamental assumptions on both the right and left, this book will inform and energize debates about why organized interests have come to exercise such control over the policy process and how we might best remedy the mischief of faction. — Alan Gibson, CSU, Chico

In the interest of limiting the power of government, James Madison and the framers of the US Constitution created a system of political institutions notoriously resistant to policy change; it tends toward gridlock. Reformers chafe at the many ”veto points” available to organized interests to stifle policy change. This important, well-researched, provocative book demonstrates how progressive reformers sought to shift the power to shape policy from the legislative branch to the executive bureaucracy. Ethridge (Univ. of Wisconsin) argues that reformers viewed this as a strategy for limiting the power of ”special interests” to stymie policy change; beyond the reach of interest groups, technocrats in the bureaucracy would promote policy changes consistent with the reformers goals. What the reformers failed to appreciate was, first, the ability of interest groups to infiltrate the bureaucracy and promote their interests, often in ways diametrically opposed to the reformers” intentions, and, second, the capacity of Congress toovercome the influence of groups and generate policy change. He argues that a return to the ”constitutional principle” of gridlock, in which special interests must compete in a legislative forum, presents the best means of promoting the public interest. Recommended.