Africa’s Informal Workers

Collective Agency, Alliances and Transnational Organizing in Urban Africa

By Ilda Lindell

Zed Books Ltd

Copyright © 2010 Ilda Lindell
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-84813-452-2

Contents

Acronyms, vii,
Introduction: the changing politics of informality – collective organizing, alliances and scales of engagement Ilda Lindell, 1,
PART ONE The political dynamics of collective organizing,
1 Seen but not heard: urban voice and citizenship for street traders Alison Brown and Michal Lyons, 33,
2 The politics of vulnerability: exit, voice and capture in three Nigerian informal manufacturing clusters Kate Meagher, 46,
3 Women leaders and the sense of power: clientelism and citizenship at the Dantokpa market in Cotonou, Benin Ebbe Prag, 65,
PART TWO Constructing alliances: organizing across the formal-informal ‘divide’,
4 Alliances across the formal-informal divide: South African debates and Nigerian experiences Gunilla Andrae and Björn Beckman, 85,
5 Self-organized informal workers and trade union initiatives in Malawi: organizing the informal economy Ignasio Malizani Jimu, 99,
6 Moments of resistance: the struggle against informalization in Cape Town David Christoffer Jordhus-Lier, 115,
7 The possibilities for collective organization of informal port workers in Tema, Ghana Owusu Boampong, 130,
8 The ‘China challenge’: the global dimensions of activism and the informal economy in Dakar Suzanne Scheld, 153,
9 Passport, please: the Cross-Border Traders Association in Zambia Wilma S. Nchito and Karen Tranberg Hansen, 169,
10 Informal workers in Kenya and transnational organizing: networking and leveraging resources Winnie V. Mitullah, 184,
Notes, 203,
Bibliography, 207,
About the contributors, 226,
Index, 229,

CHAPTER 1

Seen but not heard: urban voice and citizenship for street traders

Alison Brown and Michal Lyons

Introduction: the informal economy of the urban South

In an age of globalization the street has become the new locus of employment for the urban poor. This chapter draws on case studies from two continents to explore the concept of urban voice for street traders. Over the last twenty years, many developing-country cities have seen a rapid growth in the informal economy. Street trade is particularly evident in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, where growth in urban populations has been accompanied by limited job creation among the poor (Cohen 2003; Carr and Chen 2002).

Precise measurement of informality is difficult, but informal employment is thought to account for around 60 per cent of all urban employment in Africa, and in India to employ over 95 per cent of non-agricultural women workers (ILO 2002a: 12-16). Street traders are the largest groups in the informal economy, after home-based workers, which together represent 10-35 per cent of the nonagricultural workforce in developing countries, in comparison with 5 per cent of the total workforce in developed countries. Women often comprise a large proportion of street vendors in developing countries (ILO 2002c), except where social restrictions prevail.

The chapter first briefly summarizes debates on the concept of urban voice, and its relation to social capital. It then explores the associational structures of street traders and the institutional landscape in which they operate. Drawing on work in Africa and Asia, the chapter then argues that the representational space afforded to street traders cannot be separated from public discourse on the informal economy. This discussion sets the context for a comparative study of traders’ associations in four cities – Dakar, Accra, Dar es Salaam and Kathmandu – based on work undertaken separately by the authors in 2003–08.

Social capital and urban voice Urban voice is the means by which communities influence decision-making on issues that affect their lives, and draws heavily on social capital – the social networks based on norms, reciprocity and trust among their members (Putnam 1993; Pickvance 2003).

Social capital is recognized as a central basis of the urban economy, cultivated by the wealthy to protect and enhance their assets (Bourdieu 1984/2002) and by the poor to sustain their livelihoods and withstand adverse trends and shocks (Rakodi and Lloyd-Jones 2002). Social capital is transformed as traditional ties are adapted in urban contexts, for example through relationships that underpin changing methods of working or personal loans (Kumar and Matsusaka 2005; Lyons and Snoxell 2005a, 2005b; Buckley 1997; Phillips 2002). Critics argue that the concept has been hijacked by development agencies as a means of compensating for the neoliberal project and its lack of support for the poor (Pickvance 2003; Mayer 2003).

However, social networks and grassroots organizations are complex, facilitated by a wide range of factors including kinship, ethnic tribal and village groups, trade unions, NGOs, religious organizations, government agencies and political parties (Mitlin 2001). These are supported by a rich panoply of associational activities, for example: professional societies; trade unions; chambers of commerce; choirs; youth clubs; developmental charities; churches and religious groups; ethnic associations; welfare groups; credit associations; burial societies and many more (Tostensen et al. 2001: 17) based on networks and ties, which often go unrecognized by the state.

Global trends of democratization and decentralization have opened up new political space in which the urban poor can voice their needs, but their success depends on the institutions they can access and their ability to organize (Devas 2005). Formal processes of participation established by governments have tended to be ineffective or purloined by elites, and the extent to which the urban poor are heard depends largely on their organizing skills, and use of citizenship or participatory rights conferred by the state (Friedman 2006).

Traders’ associational structures Traders’ associations and organizations are rooted in tradition and the culture of the urban landscape in which they exist. For market and street traders, social capital – whether formally established as an association, or informal social networks – enables them to manage an intrinsically competitive environment and to negotiate with local government and other powerful actors (Lyons and Snoxell 2005a). Social capital allows traders to move from austerity to take advantage of new opportunities opened up by economic liberalization (Lourenço-Lindell 2002: 228).

The role of social capital in supporting traders’ activities, together with the inevitability of informal sector livelihoods, is well recognized by agencies such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) (Carr and Chen 2002), and informal workers’ organizations are seen as key players in the pro-poor policy debate – unions, cooperatives, associations or other representative groups (Chen et al. 2002). Yet, at urban as well as at national level, micro-enterprises rarely influence decision-making to their advantage against established interests unless they are organized (Rakodi 2003).

Trader and market associations fall into two groups – formal associations recognized by the authorities, and informal kinship, religious or other social networks. Both may provide a means for civic engagement with institutions and local authorities, but often focus on self-help and fail to maintain long-term influence (Brown 2006b). However, research suggests that many traders do not belong to any organization, and several studies suggest that organization densities among traders are low. Where traders’ associations do exist they focus on financial concerns, product-specific issues or lobbying and advocacy (Skinner 2008).

For workers, the most powerful form of associations have traditionally been trade unions, but in developing cities these are often not well established because of the lack of formal work; trade associations are another form of employment representation but tend to prioritize the interests of members to the exclusion of others; other grassroots organizations in poor communities may be far from inclusive (Devas 2005).

Trade unions or political party affiliation sometimes connect traders with broad political interests, but unions’ influence is usually only strong at times of crisis or during elections. More usually, the influence of workers’ associations is indirect and unlikely to provide leverage with local decision-makers (Devas 2004). In rare cases, traders’ organizations have developed significant negotiating power – for example the international alliance of street vendors’ organizations StreetNet, set up in the early 1990s (Lyons 2005; Brown 2006a: 210; StreetNet 2009). Thus the status of traders’ associations, and their capacity to look outwards, depends on their objectives and internal organization, but also on relations with other urban actors.

Urban governance and institutions

The governance and institutional landscape within which traders operate has a profound effect on their representational space and the extent to which they can exercise urban voice. Two trends have been evident in recent years in promoting more effective urban governance, with significantly different impacts for traders. On one hand, neoliberal philosophies have encouraged the withdrawal of urban governments from direct service provision, moving to privatization of essential services. Within this view of the ‘corporate city’, the informal economy has little place, and urban governments in both North and South are often hostile to street traders (e.g. Smith 1986; UN-Habitat 2007). Devas (2004) concluded that small, informal businesses have very little influence over decisions made by coalitions of public authorities and large private sector interests in Third World cities.

In contrast, there have been genuine attempts to empower the poor and engage new constituencies in pro-poor local government reform, and ‘honest, efficient and effective government has moved to the top of the international policy agenda’ (Ackerman 2004: 447; Isaac and Franke 2000). Development theorists argue for institutionalized participation, to foster partnerships, achieve progressive transformation and enhance pro-poor policies (Hickey and Mohan 2005; Devas 2004; Rakodi 2003), but problems occur because of the weakness of key partners, or institutional delays, leading to antagonism rather than cooperation (Devas 2004: 73, 115). Organizing poses huge problems for the poor, because of their limited time and resources, lack of leadership skills, conflicting interests, and unresponsive political systems (ibid.: 190).

One of the most successful experiments in participatory governance is participatory budgeting (PB), first introduced in Porto Alegre, Brazil, some twenty years ago. PB takes place on an annual cycle, which combines elected authorities with citizens’ councils. Participants not only make decisions but are also responsible for decision-ranking the proposed projects (Novy and Leubolt 2005). The process initially focused on poor, relatively stable city-centre neighbourhoods, but later drew in the middle classes, although migrants were still excluded (Navarro 2005; Anderson 2003). Even so, ‘voice’ is generally exercised by experienced associations, and authorities remain reluctant to recognize urban social movements (Hickey and Mohan 2005). Nevertheless, the success of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte and elsewhere (Souza 2001) has led to legislative reform that enshrines participation.

Devas (2004) concluded that participatory governance was best supported by the cumulative building of grassroots structures, and establishing processes which give a sense of purpose and power through regular participatory decision-making, e.g. annual budget allocations and annual policy reviews. Facets which affect success in participatory governance include: commitment, legal/institutional support, and the regularity of participatory processes.

NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) can also play valuable roles in articulating the interests of the urban poor. NGOs have had notable successes in securing national programmes that benefit the poor, although they are sometimes seen as ‘opportunistic and self-serving’ (Devas 2004: 191). CBOs can create rallying points, but may be hampered by conflicting interests, or exhaustion of the leaders, who themselves struggle with poverty (Devas 2005). There may also be intrinsic problems with reliance on NGOs or CBOs which may undermine effective government (Putzel 1997), or lead to forced compromises because of the need to demonstrate results (Rogerson and Nel 2005). A critical problem is that most participatory programmes focus on the involvement of residents. There has been no parallel effort to engage workers in the informal economy in urban political processes – thus street traders are excluded from public debate in areas where they have a major impact on services and management.

Street trading in public discourse The influence of traders’ associations is also affected by the social and cultural milieu in which they operate. Public discourse is often hostile to street traders, vilifying those working in the informal economy. Street traders often live in a legal vacuum outside and beyond the law (Goldie 2002), with the negation of their identity partly rooted in popular attitudes.

Informalization is perceived as a sea-change in urban living, yet large-scale changes are always a major burden because they encroach on the normal, creating stress and readjustment of fragile identities (Hermochova 1997: 110). The rapid growth in street trade is acutely visible (Keith 1995: 310), challenging established urban social relations (Dudrah 2003: 343), resulting in fear and resentment.

Expressions of fear and popular concern in Durban are vividly illustrated by Popke and Ballard (2004) in their analysis of local newspaper reports, highlighting the expressions of anxiety that form part of residents’ interpretive landscape, arguing that the arrival of street traders has been the most commonly articulated cause of the city’s decline. The use of space for street trading challenges accepted notions of order (Cresswell, in ibid.), with frequent calls to ‘bring pavement trading under control’ and for traders ‘to be sited in a designated part of town’ (ibid.: 105).

A similar fear is reflected in debates on migration (Balbo and Marconi 2005). Migrants to Johannesburg’s inner city are seen as alien, and perpetrators of disorder and crime (Kalati and Manor, in Reis and Moore 2005: 162). Johannesburg’s elites have distanced themselves from the ‘invasion’ of the city’s Central Business District (CBD) by ‘hordes of desperate poor’ (De Swaan, in ibid.: 191), resulting in an elite exodus to the suburbs, spatial segregation and expansion of the private security industry (e.g. Landau 2005; Kalati and Manor, in Reis and Moore 2005).

Thus, public discourse on street traders, particularly when associated with migration, sees them as ‘other’, an economic burden, a cause of crime and pollution, and not fit to be citizens, creating an inherent prejudice against those that try to be heard.

Methods

The chapter draws on three studies, two DfID-funded studies undertaken separately by the authors, which combine fieldwork from Senegal, Ghana, Tanzania and Nepal. Using the sustainable livelihoods framework, the studies collected data on the livelihood strategies of street traders in Dakar, Accra, Dar es Salaam and Kathmandu (Lyons and Snoxell, 2005a, 2005b; Brown 2006a). All three studies were based on extensive semi-structured interviews with traders, and key informant interviews with municipality staff, market officials, association leaders, NGOs and other relevant actors.

The four cities are chosen as exemplars of rapid urbanization and a burgeoning street economy, but with contrasting religious, social and associational traditions. With some variation, all four countries are very poor. Each has encountered the impacts of structural adjustment and economic liberalization, and their major urban centres have grappled with the informal economy for the last thirty years.

Manifestations of ‘urban voice’

Attempts by street traders to purchase a platform for legitimacy to claim their rights as urban citizens are manifest in ways which are a product of both history and culture and a response to current crises or need. This section explores the experience of the authors in four cities in the light of the discussion above. Table 1.1 illustrates comparative data for the countries in which the cities are located – all are in the lowest third of countries for which data is available both in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI) and income per capita, although interestingly all have relatively high adult literacy rates compared to their HDI, particularly Tanzania.

Dakar – brotherhoods and the colonial legacy Senegal is a francophone country with a predominantly Muslim population (96 per cent). Trade networks in Dakar are dominated by the brotherhoods, ethnic and religious trade associations which underpin both formal and informal commerce.

One of the most influential of the associations is the Mouride brotherhood, a religious group founded in the nineteenth century. Mourides developed economic power by growing peanuts, becoming incorporated into the colonial French economy, while preserving and evolving Wolof values (Diouf 2000: 683). Mouridism attracted every level of society, including freed slaves, merchants and craftsmen, creating a merchant tradition. The Mourides moved to the cities in three waves, after the First and Second World Wars and in large numbers during the droughts of the 1970s, where many became merchants (ibid.: 692).

Members of the Mouride Brotherhood dominate market associations in Dakar (Lyons and Snoxell 2005a). Brotherhood membership provides a crucial introduction to customers and suppliers in the marketplace. Trading is predominantly carried out by men, but women who work as traders also socialize through women’s prayer circles, or Dairas. Members of the other major brotherhoods in Senegal, notably the Tijanes and Alayes, are also heavily engaged in trade.

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