ROBUST MECHANISM DESIGN: THE ROLE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION AND HIGHER ORDER BELIEFS (World Scientific Economic Theory)
Author: Dirk Bergemann (Author), Stephen Morris (Author)
Publisher: World Scientific Publishing Company
Publication date: 2012-03-23
Language: English
Print length: 472 pages
ISBN-10: 981437458X
ISBN-13: 9789814374583
Book Description
Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.
Review
This book combines many of their papers with an excellent introduction that overviews the field and explains how their papers fit together. Highly recommended to all students and practitioners of economic theory, and essential reading for would-be mechanism designers. — Drew Fudenberg “Department of Economics, Harvard University”
The question of the design of institutions has been at the center of some of the most important economic theory in the past four decades. Bergemann and Morris have made seminal contributions to the understanding of how uncertainty can and should be incorporated into mechanism design, and this volume reproduces a collection of their most important work in the area. The volume will be an important reference for those working in the area and those who wish to apply the ideas in economic models. — Andrew Postlewaite “Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania”
From the Back Cover
The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.
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